Transcendental Theology for Non-Believers by Kowalik, Michael
 
 
1 
Transcendental Theology for Non-Believers 
 
Michael Kowalik 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Pope Benedict XVI argued that it is "necessary and reasonable to raise the question of God through 
the use of reason" and to understand "theology, as inquiry into the rationality of faith." (Ratzinger 
2006) The idea that faith per se can be reconciled with rationality per se presents a delicate analytical 
task for philosophy of religion, to consistently ground a belief system which is regarded by non-
believers as inherently ungrounded and inconsistent, without negating any grounding postulates 
internal to the dogma. Focussing on Abrahamic theism, with special emphasis on Christianity, I 
interpret the Biblical narrative as a symbolic representation of a universal normative structure 
grounded in social ontology and the value-commitments intrinsic to agency.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Religious ideas were the primary mode of cultural expression throughout human history. Since the 
Palaeolithic period "the history of religious ideas and beliefs is one with the history of civilisation." 
(Eliade 1978) The last two centuries of the Common Era were exceptional in that regard, witnessing a 
protracted decline of religious thought and the rise of secularism, but the dichotomy of religion vis a 
vis secularism may rest on a mischaracterisation of the latter. It is not a trivial matter that the 
emergence of secularism was a uniquely Christian phenomenon. According to Altizer (2003, 5), the 
ending of Christianity as the overtly dominant force in Europe "impacted upon the world as a whole, 
initiating a new and comprehensive secularism, yet that secularism can be and has been understood 
as being in essential continuity with the Christendom that generated it". Thousands of years of ritual 
conditioning and sacramental trauma cannot be erased merely by not believing in God. The 
contemporary secular mindset is still infused with Christian symbolism and conscience which were 
'merely secularised', reconfigured by means of reason into humanist ethics. I argue that religious 
ideas are not just a contingent result of irrational imagination but, in general, symbolise something 
fundamental to what human beings have intrinsically in common. The specific aim of this study is to 
demonstrate that Abrahamic theism, and Christianity in particular, can be grounded a priori in the 
constitutive conditions of agency without negating any of the canonical dogmas: transcendental 
theology. 
 
 
2. On Faith 
 
Religion typically involves a commitment to a dogma: a set of alleged truths that every adherent of a 
particular religion believes 'as true', and this belief constitutes the Religion. The general epistemic 
schema of religious belief is therefore logically circular: conviction about the truth-value of the object 
of belief obtains, at least in part, in virtue of it being believed. The primary obstacle to reconciliation 
of religion with reason is therefore the very question of faith. The meaning of faith per se must be 
sufficiently rational to remain open to logically non-regressive epistemic validation, or else, its 
epistemic circularity must be somehow grounded in realist ontology.  
 
The Greek word Pistis (Πίστις; πιστεύω), one of the key terms in Christian theology, is routinely 
translated as Faith, although the meaning of Pistis is both broader and epistemically weaker than the 
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contemporary idea of religious faith, that of 'strong belief in the doctrines of religion, based on 
spiritual conviction rather than proof'1. In Greek mythology, Pistis was understood as the 
personification of good faith, trust and honesty (Liddell and Scott 1940), but the Christian tradition is 
believed to have drawn on a more recent, discursive sense of the term: to be open to persuasion by 
the evidence of Reason/Logos (λόγος). (Hay 1989) (Danker 2000) The state of permanent openness 
to persuasion without assuming that our knowledge is already complete, already perfect, is still 
consistent with showing good faith in regard to someone else's point of view, rendering Pistis a state 
of intellectual or perhaps spiritual openness to something beyond ourselves. I suggest that the older 
definition of Pistis, understood as having good faith in relation to others, is the most rational 
approximation of the intended meaning (Cf. Titus 2:10). This interpretation is also roughly consistent 
with the Hebrew term for faith – Emunah (ֱאמּונָה) – which has linguistic connotations of faithfulness 
and discerning trust: an active principle, akin to giving support to another. 
 
A discourse necessarily involves reciprocal commitment to generate meaning, to be understood and 
to understand one another in good faith. This active aspect was extensively theorised by Jürgen 
Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel in relation to the principle of Discourse Ethics. The central idea of 
Discourse Ethics is that when we speak or respond in a meaningful way to another we are affirming 
certain symmetry about meaning, whose value or truth-aptness consists solely in being rationally 
held in common. According to Apel, by verbalising any claim we are implicitly recognising our 
interlocutor as a being capable of rationally responding to our claim and we are inviting them to do 
so: "The logical justification for our thought" therefore commits us to "understand arguments 
critically" and to "mutually recognize each other as participants with equal rights in the discussion." 
(Apel 1996, 29) This "consensual-communicative rationality [is] presupposed already in the use of 
language (and, therefore, in thought itself)…" (Ibid. 210-11). It follows that communicating in good 
faith in order to accomplish reciprocal affinity of meaning – a communion of Logos – is the grounding 
principle of all meaning, of thought, and therefore of our personhood. Our will to exist is then 
inseparable from the need for meaning, manifested in practice as an inclination or 'thirst' for 
intersubjective communion of Logos. 
 
The idea of 'good faith' can be readily extended to spirituality, as openness to the communion of 
human consciousness with God2. This would in turn imply a degree of spiritual affinity with God. The 
Christian sacrament of Communion seems to reflect this symbolism. Following the example of 
Discourse Ethics, the concept of faith as simply 'openness to Spirit' may not fully capture the essence 
of the term. In addition to openness, a special inclination or thirst for spiritual communion may be 
required. There are indeed instances in the canon stressing the importance of such an inclination: 
"ask and you shall receive, seek and you shall find" (Matthew 7:7, Luke 11:9); "Let anyone who is 
thirsty come to me and drink" (John 7:37). "By this he meant the Spirit", clarifies John. 
 
The proposed interpretation has an important, counterintuitive aspect. A measure of doubt, in the 
sense of not being committed to the truth of something without careful consideration of reasons, may 
indeed be an essential part of having good faith, because without doubt we could not give fair 
consideration to the relevant subject-matter. By denying the possibility of being mistaken or ignorant 
about something we would implicitly deny the authority of reason as a normative principle, and 
therefore negate the possibility of meaning. "The element of doubt is an element in faith itself." 
(Tillich 1967, xli) The colloquial understanding of faith as an innate conviction or certainty about the 
meaning of some aspect of the scripture, or of religious experience, faces another logical impasse. The 
absolute certainty about anything implies that the believer cannot possibly be mistaken in that 
respect, which in turn implies that the believer knows Everything; any gap in knowledge, anything 
unknown, could affect the truth of the relevant conviction. It follows that whoever cannot possibly be 
wrong is necessarily All Knowing and therefore God, but this renders the idea of faith (as an absolute 
personal knowledge of some aspect of God) inconsistent and potentially blasphemous.  
 
Ultimately, faith implies a value-commitment to the object of faith and as such presupposes good faith 
with respect to that object; it would be absurd to have faith in something in bad faith. Since good faith 
entails awareness of uncertainty about our epistemic capacities, it precludes unconditional belief. It is 
                                           
1 "Faith." Oxford Dictionary of English, 2nd Edition, Revised. Oxford University Press, 2005. 
2 Let us for now regard the term 'God' as a placeholder for something yet to be defined. I will attend to 
this term in the next section. 
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therefore true a priori that faith is not unconditional belief but just 'good faith': openness and thirst 
towards the object of faith coupled with uncertainty about our understanding of the object.  
 
The practical consequence of taking faith to mean 'good faith in relation to others and to the Spirit', 
instead of 'certainty of belief about something for which there is no proof', is that it complements 
rationality instead of being contrary to reason. Faith understood in this way is also the Ethos of Logos, 
an essential aspect of Logos without which there can be no meaning, thought or personhood. To 
abandon 'good faith' is to commit oneself to the void, to spiritual non-existence; apart from the 
unifying power of Logos, everything falls apart. For the same reason, if God's nature were contrary to 
reason it would be empty of meaning, therefore impossible, therefore not God. A fitting name for such 
an incoherent facsimile of God is, arguably, Evil. God may therefore be the foundation of Logos, the 
ground of Reason, which is neither identical with Reason nor separate or contrary to Reason. In order 
to be in communion with the Spirit we must first be in communion with Logos; for this to be possible, 
good faith is necessary. This characterisation of Faith may seem unorthodox, but it was emphatically 
affirmed by Pope Benedict XVI (Ratzinger 2006) in his famous Regensburg Lecture: "Not to act 
reasonably, not to act with Logos, is contrary to the nature of God [which is Logos]." Another way, any 
epistemic commitment based on inconsistent reasoning is not compatible with Logos. This insight, or 
perhaps a rediscovery of the true meaning of Faith, may be one of the most important theological 
shifts in the evolution of Christianity, in principle reconciling Faith with Western rationalism and 
creating an opening for inter-faith coherence. 
 
 
3. The Image of God 
 
Religions don’t spring out of nowhere; they are arguably an expression of cumulative experience 
symbolically codified as the primary normative structure in every pre-modern communication 
community. The concept of God is central to this crystallisation of meaning. If this concept signifies 
something in every culture, then what meaning is expressed thereby? Is it possible to understand 
‘God’ in a way that transcends any particular religious dogma? 
 
In order to meaningfully address this question from transcendental perspective one must commit to 
an idea of divinity which is meaningful not only for cultures that are explicitly theistic but also for 
those that are agnostic, secular or even ostensibly atheistic. If 'God' is taken to mean an omnipotent, 
all-knowing person in some transcendent realm (Heaven) who makes demands of his creations and 
punishes disobedience then many would deny believing in such a person. Some may even argue that 
this conception of God is a priori refutable. If, on the other hand, 'God' is a hypothetical embodiment 
or a personification of our highest ideal, our highest value, then, in that sense, we all do believe in 
God. Disagreements about the belief in God are then focused on what the highest ideal ought to be. 
Curiously, the more common, apparently simplistic and naive idea of God as a person who has 
absolute knowledge and power is not as simple and naive on closer examination. Do we not profess to 
value our rational agency above all else whenever we act on a reason? (Kowalik 2019) Are we not 
universally committed to value our capacity to act, our knowledge, insights and wisdom? The 
personified image of God plausibly signifies the ideal Man, the ultimate agency of which we all 
possess a trace: the idea of what it means to be human.3 Do atheists then 'believe' in the idea of 
personified God? Not explicitly, but implicitly we all do even if we explicitly deny it; the idea of a 
personified God as the ideal Self is something we always already believe in and worship about 
ourselves, even if we cannot fully attain it. What counts in favour of this interpretation is that great 
conquerors of the classical world were regarded as actual gods, whose divine status was 'proven' by 
their extraordinary agential capacities. (Aristotle 1984, Politics 1284a) 
 
Personification of the image of God is then not just an idea of 'God as a person' but a value 
commitment to 'ideal personhood' as God. Another way, we are universally committed to the ideal of 
personhood as the archetype of all instances of personhood. In religious practice it may be an ideal 
                                           
3 This idea was elaborated by Paul Tillich: "The risk of faith is based on the fact that the unconditional 
element can become a matter of ultimate concern only if it appears in a concrete embodiment. It can 
appear in purified and rationalized mythological symbols like God as highest personal being (...) And 
it is based on a foundation which is not risk: the awareness of the unconditional element in ourselves 
and our world." (Tillich 1959, 28) 
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we strive to realise, maximise, to perfect ourselves and become its faithful image. In God (Logos) we 
worship the essence of Anthropos as the ground of all meaning, as that which is Sacred, and we thus 
vicariously personify ourselves as that which we always implicitly idealise. Imago Homini, the 
practical reality of man, polluted by error (Hamartia), thus merges with the trace of Imago Dei 
(Genesis 1:27), the essence of Man made sacred. This essence is arguably not just rational agency 
(which presupposes consciousness) but the immutable laws of existence, the laws of meaning and the 
social-reflexivity that ontologically grounds every conscious subject and is exemplified in 
showing 'good faith' towards others. There may be much more to the idea of God, perhaps even a 
genuine metaphysical force that touches all being, but there cannot be any less to the image of God 
than the ideal of personhood. 
 
This way of conceptualising God has one unprecedented feature; it shifts the religious discourse 
beyond dogmatic belief into the realm of transcendental evaluation. The coincidence of our highest 
ideal with the idea of God becomes a matter of Logos, of logical consequence of our shared value-
commitments. 
 
 
4. Creation: Breaking the Circle 
 
"In the beginning there was Logos, and Logos was with God, and Logos was God… Through it all 
things were made, and apart from it nothing was made that has been made. In it was life and the life 
was the light of humanity." (John 1:1-4) 
 
Intentional action entails the capacity to discriminate between more or less valuable actions, and any 
distinction of value presupposes an ideal according to which value could be measured. All ideas, the 
content of thought, all differences and boundaries, are a product of discrimination in favour of what 
matters and how it matters, which is to say, the world as we know it is a result of cumulative 
discrimination geared towards an aim that matters above all else. It follows that nothing happens for 
consciousness without an ideal or standard of value by means of which it is possible to reduce the 
infinite complexity of being-as-such (or to partition the absolute indifference of All-is-One) to a 
multiplicity of differentiated and meaningful content. Our intrinsic ideal of personhood is therefore 
the true creator of the world as we know it. 
 
Conceiving of the ideal of personhood as the sole creative power (God) allows us to retroactively 
posit the un-created, the timeless, the indefinite, the unconscious primordial substrate on which The 
Beginning of the realm of Logos, of time, meaning and consciousness could be inscribed. Such 
primordial unity is symbolised by Ouroboros, the self-consuming circle of unconscious life, the realm 
of All-is-One (ἓν τὸ πᾶν) where 'nothing matters'. It signifies Nature, the unconscious, perpetual cycle 
of birth, reproduction and death, which in turn implies animality: instinctive repetition and the 
absence of transcendence towards an ideal. Animality happens; it does not do. Consciousness, on the 
other hand, requires meaning, an ideal beyond pure repetition. To be human is to break out of the 
circle of Nature, to realise the Self in the reflexive relation with other individuals of the same 
ontological kind and thus become conscious of transcending one's own animality. 
 
Thomas Nagel (1974, 436) has famously argued that for an organism to have "conscious experience 
at all means, basically, that there is something it is like to be that organism." Crucially, the 
phenomenological question of 'what it is like to be me' exemplifies a fundamental property of 
reflexive-consciousness and cannot be meaningfully answered just in terms of 'me', as 'I am me' or 'I 
am like me', without falling prey to circular reasoning or triviality. "[Self-identity] is certainly a 
relation formally or logically speaking, but it also holds trivially, it's trivially true of everything…" 
(Strawson 2013, 21) It follows that I can be myself only indirectly, socially, by consistently identifying 
with what I identify others as, insofar as others identify reciprocally. "The individual self will only 
emerge through the course of social externalization, and can only be stabilized within the network of 
undamaged relations of mutual recognition." (Habermas 2003, 34) Phenomenology of self-oriented 
awareness has thus implicitly demonstrated that reciprocal recognition is an ontological condition of 
conscious identity and therefore of agency; an idea which may go back to the ancient (albeit 
uncertain) etymological roots of the word ánthrōpos ('man'): someone who is alike / the likeness of 
man. This socio-ontological thesis is rigorously developed in Kowalik (2019). 
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5. On Sin and Repentance
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from the realm of Logos, into the sphere of personal convictions and the irreconcilable interpersonal 
conflict, vulnerability, fear and resentment that such convictions entail. The event of being 'exiled by 
God' is then not an additional action but an inescapable ontological consequence of the erroneous 
choice that Adam and Eve have themselves made. It is a choice that always remains universally 
present; we are existentially compelled to make that choice every moment, as it lies at the core of 
every intention. When we ignore it, when we do not take it seriously, we fall into ontological error 
and diminish our humanity. 
 
It is of little value to acknowledge that some action is wrong without understanding why it is wrong. 
Only when we understand the principle of wrongdoing we are capable of initiating a genuine change 
of mind, that is, we must be able to comprehend what we believe to be wrong not just as being 
'wrong' dogmatically but as a principle which is comprehensible and consistently motivating 'for us'. 
As Goethe writes in "Dichtung und Wahrheit", 2.8: "we can not see a mistake until we are free of it." In 
essence, the capacity to discern right from wrong requires consistent evaluation. The associated idea 
of Repentance is then just a change of attitude from affirmation of error to affirmation of that which is 
true, correct or right; the relevant transgression may ultimately be a transgression against ourselves, 
against our existence as Imago Homini, the Anthropos which, when free from error, is perhaps 
coincidental with Imago Dei. Sin understood in this way is not just a moral but ontological principle, 
an erroneous attitude of implicit denial of what we essentially are and thus negates our human 
essence: Logos. To deny Logos within us is to deny ourselves, to renounce the light of our humanity in 
favour of unconscious, animal existence; "sin is, in its essence, a renunciation of the truth." (Ratzinger 
1995, 71) On another level, sin is a normalisation and acceptance of the collective ontological damage 
caused by every past instance of renunciation of the truth. (Ibid. 73) Error begets error. 
 
The ultimate consequence of sin is exemplified in the Biblical story of Cain and Abel (Genesis 4), the 
first two sons of Adam and Eve. Abel, the younger brother of Cain, is manifestly favoured by God, 
exemplifying an ideal of righteousness that Cain could not match (1 John 3:12). Driven by jealousy 
and resentment of Abel, Cain subsequently slays his brother. A more detailed interpretation is given 
in the Quran (Surah 5:27-31), suggesting that Abel was intrinsically steadfast in his aversion to 
murder even in self-defence, whereas Cain's "soul permitted him to murder his brother". On this 
account, the special relationship of Abel with God seems more fundamental than just being liked; it 
may amount to reflexive, ontological affinity - being true to the likeness of the human ideal 
personified as God. Following the murder of Abel, Cain's descendants progressively populate the 
Earth beside the descendants of Seth, the youngest son of Adam and Eve, whose descendant is Noah. 
In the time of Noah, God decides to wipe the existing mankind off the earth, seeing His creation as 
corrupted beyond redemption, except Noah, whom God saves as the template of future humanity. It is 
noteworthy that the punitive annihilation was represented as a great flood consuming all living 
things except those accommodated on Noah's Ark. Symbolism of the flood suggest a return of all 
antagonistic beings to the undifferentiated common source, the unconscious sea, re-establishing the 
essential ontological unity corrupted by sin begetting sin since the murder of Abel. Cain's act of 
devaluing the existence of just one human being, a member of his own kin, has implicitly devalued all 
of humankind, thus initiating the process of annihilation of 'the world as we know it'. The said story 
arguably reveals social reflexivity as the ontological condition of human existence; we can preserve 
the integrity of our existence, stay true to the kind, only in virtue of continuously affirming the value 
of humanity in every instance of its manifestation. This ontological condition is later crystallised in 
the Golden Rule, "Love your neighbour as yourself" (Leviticus 19:18), and fully universalised in Jesus' 
pronouncement: "Love your enemies" (Matthew 5:44; Luke 6:27). Transgression against the 
constitutive conditions of conscious agency is possible, but every such transgression diminishes our 
existence as beings of the human kind (Kowalik 2019). 
 
"In everything that they do, they constitute themselves. Therefore they themselves (…) are always 
present as their standard, and when they reject this standard they deceive themselves. They do not 
free themselves, but place themselves in opposition to the truth. And that means that they are 
destroying themselves and the world." (Ratzinger 1995, 61) 
 
This kind of ontological liability or 'guilt' implies that certain actions have the same effect irrespective 
of their rational or moral justification, are not neutralised by self-defence, political rights, authority or 
good intentions, but damage us nonetheless, no matter what the circumstances. "Thou shalt not kill" 
is arguably a prime example of ontological liability that diminishes our existence even if we must kill 
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to survive. As such, ontological wrongs entail an absolute liability requiring a special attitude, not one 
that only hopes that killing in self-defence will not be necessary, nor one that allows oneself to be 
killed (what would also arguably be an ontological wrong) but a proactive, rational effort to prevent 
absolute wrongs such as killing other humans from arising in the first place. Apart from any deeper 
metaphysical significance, the attitude of compassion, humility, rational consideration of the interests 
of others, or simply Good Faith, is a strategy geared for morally imperfect beings to be able to achieve 
that end. To be kind to others is a reflexive way of being 'true to kind', Imago Homini reflecting Imago 
Dei. 
 
 
6. On Salvation 
 
According to Genesis, God presented Adam and Eve with a prohibition that was destined to be 
transgressed. Perhaps this apparent contradiction is the key to understanding the problem of evil and 
all the seemingly unloving, outrageous or violent commands that a genuinely 'loving' God would 
surely not unironically inflict on the humankind. One plausible theory of salvation is that God, the 
personified ideal of conscious agency made Sacred, may genuinely tempt us to do wrong so that we 
may apply Logos on our own authority as rational agents, out of our own free will, to make the right 
choice irrespective of any external authority; only then we are truly 'saved', when we have 
internalised the principle of good and evil to the point that we merge with the moral essence of God 
and thereby fully transcend our animality. 
 
The ultimate test of our moral essence can perhaps be revealed only when we believe that God is 
dead, when there is no God, when no one is watching, when we believe that there will be no 
judgement or metaphysical consequence to our actions. If we are indeed imbued with the correct 
understanding of the principle of existence then we ought to able to make the right choice no matter 
who commands us to do otherwise. I suggest that the premise of Christ 'dying for our sins' should be 
understood as 'God died so that we may sin, with impunity', because only when everything is 
permitted we will find out who we really are, to what levels of depravity we are willing to stoop, or 
raise above. Only absolute moral freedom can reveal our moral essence, which is a cumulative effect 
of all our thoughts and actions, and this in turn implies that secularism and atheism could be a way of 
realising 'the last judgement'. Through our actions we judge ourselves. 
 
When we indulge the Human within us, the Human grows, the Animal fades; when we indulge the 
Animal within us, the Animal grows, the Human fades, which is to say, our rational agency, Logos, 
Imago Dei, is progressively extinguished. When we become aware of the actions that obscure the 
truth and propagate ontological error, provided that our true nature is indeed to value truth over 
error, only then we can feel genuine regret, which is perhaps to say, we can genuinely repent. In that 
moment, the moment of repentance, we ascend to become judges of ourselves according to the 
highest ideal and thus simultaneously transcend our wrongdoings and the state of being a 
wrongdoer; we metaphysically become what we 'ought to be': Imago Dei. It is then not the judgement 
that is frightening but its hypothetical absence, the indefinite deferral of judgement until there is 
nothing left in us which is worth saving, nothing Sacred. On this hypothetical account, the world is 
imbued with ontological justice: the inhuman things we do dehumanise us, turn us into animals and 
ultimately to stone. If this is true then it makes sense to say that "God is one God because justice is 
one." (Tillich 1959, 38) 
 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Transcendental theology posits that the meaning of religion is encoded symbolically, rather than 
expressed literally. Characterisation of a text as religious scripture, as the Revelation of God’s will, is 
already symbolic; it presupposes a moral, epistemic and spiritual commitments that go beyond 
acceptance of any material facts. Religion is intrinsically symbolic. Transcendental theology is 
nevertheless compatible with the scripture being also literally true and with God’s autonomous 
existence in the classical-realist sense of the term without presupposing it, but focuses on the aspect 
of God’s being which is manifested in or for the human mind. There is a logical space, even logical 
necessity, for mind dependent but still necessary truths about being, ontological truths which are 
essential to consciousness, presupposed by consciousness of being. The symbolic, insofar as it 
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signifies the essential properties and presuppositions of being human, is the most objective 
interpretational form we have access to, the most fundamental real. The pursuit of this essential 
symbolism is then the strongest form of realism. The transcendental view of religion is therefore a 
form of essentialist realism as opposed to naive realism (without negating it); a pursuit of the essence 
of conscious being as a mode of God’s existence. To discover the full extent of the normative 
implications that can be derived from what we intrinsically have in common is a task for the future of 
philosophy of religion; perhaps a unified theory of inter-faith normativity. 
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